31.1.2018 A8-0383/12

Amendment 12

Françoise Grossetête, Burkhard Balz on behalf of the PPE Group

Report A8-0383/2017 Jonás Fernández

European Central Bank Annual Report for 2016 2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 44

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

44. Asks the ECB to ensure the independence of the members of its internal Audit Committee; urges the ECB, in order to prevent conflicts of interest, to publish declarations of financial interests for its Governing Council members; urges the ECB to ensure that the Ethics Committee is not chaired by a former President or other past members of the Governing Council of the ECB, nor by anyone liable to conflict of interest; calls the ECB Governing Council to follow the EU Staff Regulations and Code of Conduct and require a two-year professional abstention period for its outgoing members after the conclusion of their mandate; stresses that the members of the Executive Board of the ECB should abstain from being simultaneous members of forums or other organisations which include executives from banks supervised by the ECB;

44 Asks the ECB to ensure the independence of the members of its internal Audit Committee; urges the ECB, in order to prevent conflicts of interest, to publish declarations of financial interests for its Governing Council members; urges the ECB to ensure that the Ethics Committee is not chaired by a former President or other past members of the Governing Council of the ECB, nor by anyone liable to conflict of interest; calls on the ECB Governing Council to follow the EU Staff Regulations and Code of Conduct and require a two-year professional abstention period for its outgoing members after the conclusion of their mandate; stresses that the members of the Executive Board of the ECB should in principle abstain from being simultaneous members of forums or other organisations which include executives from banks supervised by the ECB, unless such membership is in line with established practice at global level and the ECB participates alongside other central banks such as the United States Federal Reserve or the Bank of Japan; considers that in these cases the ECB should take appropriate measures to avoid possible interference with its supervisory role and should not participate in discussions regarding individual banks under its

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supervision;

Or. en

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