31.1.2018 A8-0383/7

Amendment 7

Marco Valli, Rolandas Paksas on behalf of the EFDD GroupReport A8-0383/2017 Jonás Fernández

European Central Bank Annual Report for 2016 2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 10

Motion for a resolution

Amendment

10. Agrees with the ECB that a balanced mix of sound and growth-friendly national fiscal policies on a basis of full respect for the SGP, including its built-in flexibility, as well as socially balanced and ambitious productivity-enhancing reforms, are also required at Member State level in order to turn the current, cyclical recovery into a scenario of lasting, sustainable, and robust structural long-term economic development;

AM1144755EN.docx

10. Deplores the role played by the ECB in advocating a mix of harmful austerity policies on a basis of full respect for the SGP, as well as socially unbalanced, neoliberal structural reforms aimed at restoring the external competitiveness of weaker economies through the internal devaluation of wages, which has resulted in a deeper recession, a rise in poverty and unemployment and, at the same time, higher debt-to-GDP ratios; highlights that in order to turn the current weak cyclical recovery into a scenario of lasting, sustainable, and robust structural long-term economic development, there is an urgent need to boost public investment at Member State level, particularly in those countries with less fiscal space; recalls, in this regard, that public investment, especially in research and development, education, social security and health, while stimulating aggregate demand in the short term, also generates higher returns on output in the long term, thereby leading to a reduction of the public debt-to-GDP ratio as the denominator increases;

Or. en

PE614.376v01-00

United in diversity

31.1.2018 A8-0383/8

Amendment 8

Marco Valli, Rolandas Paksas on behalf of the EFDD GroupReport A8-0383/2017 Jonás Fernández

European Central Bank Annual Report for 2016 2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 11

11. Considers that, given the current inefficiencies of the monetary policy transmission channels, the ECB must ensure that price stability, defined by the ECB Council of Governors as an inflation rate of close to but below 2 %, is achieved; believes that the ECB should nonetheless carefully assess the benefits and side-effects of its policy, in particular as regards intended action to combat deflation in the future; believes that in order to create certainty and trust in the financial markets, the ECB should focus on a clear and concise communication of its monetary policy measures;

11. Considers that, given the current inefficiencies of the monetary policy transmission channels and the repeated failure to reach both the headline and core inflation targets, the ECB must ensure that accommodative policies are maintained until price stability, defined by the ECB Council of Governors as an inflation rate of close to but below 2 %, is achieved and the economy has returned to full employment; believes that the ECB should nonetheless redesign its extraordinary monetary policies in such a way that they are transmitted effectively to the real economy, in particular through the introduction of mandatory requirements to use the extra liquidity to provide lending to the real economy, instead of investing in risky financial assets; calls on the ECB, moreover, to carefully assess the benefits and side-effects of its policy, in particular as regards intended action to combat deflation in the future; believes that in order to create certainty and trust in the financial markets, the ECB should focus on a clear, transparent and concise communication of its monetary policy measures;

Or. en

31.1.2018 A8-0383/9

Amendment 9

Marco Valli, Rolandas Paksas on behalf of the EFDD GroupReport A8-0383/2017 Jonás Fernández

European Central Bank Annual Report for 2016 2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 18

18. Considers that, as noted by the ECB President, monetary policy is not sufficient to sustain economic recovery, nor can it contribute to solving the structural problems of the European economy, unless it is complemented by carefully designed, socially balanced and fair long-term growth- and competitiveness-enhancing policies at Member State level, in combination with sound fiscal policy and within the Stability and Growth Pact; agrees with the ECB, furthermore, that it is necessary to deepen the institutional architecture of EMU to support the above-mentioned reforms and to make the euro area more resilient to macroeconomic shocks;

18. Considers that, as noted by the ECB President, monetary policy is not sufficient to sustain economic recovery, nor can it contribute to solving the structural problems of the euro area and the European economy as a whole, unless it is complemented by expansionary, demand-side fiscal policies at Member State level to support aggregate demand and achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth, as well as radical reforms aimed at addressing the asymmetries that were at the root of the euro area crisis; stresses, therefore, that it is necessary to revise the institutional architecture of EMU by removing the existing budgetary constraints on public investments under the SGP and by setting up genuine risk-sharing arrangements to make the euro area more resilient to macroeconomic shocks; warns, in this regard, that with the unwinding of quantitative easing, and in the absence of any form of debt mutualisation, the lasting financial vulnerabilities and profound asymmetries in the euro area are likely to re-emerge, leading to a substantial widening of sovereign spreads and the threat of a new sovereign crisis;

Or. en

31.1.2018 A8-0383/10

Amendment 10

Marco Valli, Rolandas Paksas on behalf of the EFDD GroupReport A8-0383/2017 Jonás Fernández

European Central Bank Annual Report for 2016 2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 21

21. Stresses that in order to ensure the full effectiveness of monetary policy, current account imbalances must be corrected with appropriate fiscal, economic policies and productivity-enhancing reforms;

21. Stresses that persistently high current account surpluses in the core Eurozone countries are detrimental to the economic recovery of the countries on the periphery and to the European economy as a whole, and are therefore preventing rebalancing among countries; stresses the need for such macroeconomic imbalances to be properly addressed and excessive surpluses corrected with appropriate fiscal and economic policies; calls on the Commission, therefore, to take prompt and decisive action in this regard under the macroeconomic imbalance procedure;

Or. en

31.1.2018 A8-0383/11

Amendment 11

Marco Valli, Rolandas Paksas on behalf of the EFDD GroupReport A8-0383/2017 Jonás Fernández

European Central Bank Annual Report for 2016 2017/2124(INI)

Motion for a resolution Paragraph 27 a (new)

27a. Highlights with concern the risks to financial stability stemming from the high exposure of some banking systems to level 2 and level 3 financial assets, including derivatives; regrets the fact that, since its inception, the ECB has taken no action to tackle the risks associated with these illiquid and complex instruments; reiterates its call to include exposure to level 2 and level 3 assets among the ECB's supervisory priorities for 2018;

Or. en

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