This axiom of the financial markets is once again confirmed at Boeing. On several occasions in recent years, in this case as in those of Intel or Estée Lauder, for example, MarketScreener has warned against the folly of massive share buy-backs carried out at prohibitive valuations.

Is this a lamentable submission to the short-term diktat of the financial markets - in essence opposed to the long-term views to which an industrialist must imperatively adhere - or sheer incompetence? Everyone will be the judge.

After spending more than $45 billion on share buy-backs over the last ten years, Boeing now finds itself carrying a net debt equivalent to exactly that amount. The company is caught unprepared at a time when operational failures are piling up, as is the need to launch new investment programs.

The failures in question - chronic safety problems across most of its product range, strikes on its assembly lines, a slowdown in orders for its defense business, the re-integration of Spirit AeroSystems, etc. - are making the headlines in the press. - are the talk of the press, and are responsible for a cumulative loss of $22 billion between 2019 and 2023.

What the press dwells on less is the fact that Boeing is completely dependent on the credit markets to finance its current activities. If its credit rating is downgraded, the spiral can quickly spiral out of control - and asphyxiation can happen any day now. The aim is to avoid the looming downgrade at all costs.

To this end, in the absence of assets to dispose of, there is a priori no other choice but to bail out shareholders' equity, as a Wells Fargo analyst had the audacity to point out yesterday. (He also pointed out that Boeing and Wells have in all likelihood no commercial relations...).

A capital increase would be carried out at a price between a third and a half lower than those at which share buybacks were carried out during the last cycle. We'd be hard-pressed to find a more epic example of value destruction.

Last March, we warned that, in our opinion, Boeing's valuation did not reflect the extremely stressed situation the manufacturer was facing. On the contrary, it seemed to incorporate a rapid normalization, or even a providential return of the business to its historical profitability levels.

Indeed, in its best years, Boeing posted net income of between $5 and $10 billion. But those best years are long gone, and the challenge now is to justify a market capitalization of $96 billion, on top of $45 billion in net debt. No mean feat, even for the most optimistic analysts.

Another axiom of the financial markets would argue that it is the fate of all hyper-capitalized businesses to go under at some point in their history, even when they appear to be operating from a substantial competitive advantage.

This remains the case for Boeing, holder of a unique and sovereign know-how, still in a virtual duopoly with Airbus in civil markets and Lockheed Martin in defense markets.