The meteoric rise of sales, which has seen revenue increase tenfold over 2006-2016, with the group's market capitalization following an equivalent trajectory, was followed by a long period of stagnation that shows no sign of ending.

Under Armour released its annual results earlier this month, simultaneously dampening hopes of a rebound. All said, the group's revenue has not budged much in ten years; when adjusted for inflation, it has therefore declined significantly, while turnaround efforts have yet to reverse the trend.

Admirable cost control and a refusal to compromise on pricing have enabled the group to maintain a positive operating margin over the cycle, except in 2020, for which it is fully excused given the circumstances at that time (Covid pandemic); nevertheless, the business is under pressure and, excluding the pandemic episode, 2026 stands out as the weakest fiscal year of the decade.

However, one point of interest lies in the group's shareholding structure, led by the Canadian insurer Fairfax, headed by Prem Watsa. Watsa is renowned for having successfully cloned the Berkshire Hathaway strategy, using insurance operations to fund a contrarian investment style.

On equal footing with Fairfax is BDT Partners, the fund led by Byron Trott, famously known as "Warren Buffett's favorite banker." Together, these heavyweight backers control a third of the capital, just ahead of the brand's founder and CEO Kevin Plank, who also owns slightly less than a sixth of the capital but holds the vast majority of voting rights.

What do Fairfax and BDT see in Under Armour? Perhaps the opportunity to take a stake in a globally recognized sportswear brand at attractive valuation multiples - specifically, at little over half of its revenue and between 8x and 10x EBITDA.

It would probably take more to motivate their interest, as these multiples are, after all, within the industry average for brands without growth. In this respect, rumors that the Fairfax-BDT-Plank trio intends to take Under Armour private remain persistent.

And since none of these parties is accustomed to overpaying for acquisitions, minority shareholders are operating here with a sword of Damocles that is difficult to ignore.

Unless they are betting on a genuine recovery? Unlike Lululemon and Nike, Under Armour has only very modest exposure to the Chinese market. This potentially leaves the brand more in control of its own destiny, making the prospects of returning to growth perhaps more tangible.