The Iran conflict: a windfall for the Russian energy
At the start of 2026, Russia's economic outlook looked worrying. In January, Russian energy exports posted their weakest performance since 2020. Hydrocarbons, which still accounted for 45% of Russian budget revenues in 2021, only made up about 20% in 2025. Tens-even hundreds-of millions of barrels of Russian oil remained stranded at sea, dumped on the black market or waiting for buyers, depressing prices and complicating the financing of the war in Ukraine.
Everything has changed with the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East in late February 2026. US and Israeli strikes on Iran, and Tehran's retaliation (closing the Strait of Hormuz and attacking refineries), instantly tightened global oil supply. Within days, prices soared, before Donald Trump's words tempered the spike on Monday evening.
But the jump in the Brent barrel between February 28 and today has benefited Russia. Moscow, the world's third-largest exporter of gas and oil, has remained one of the few countries able to export oil and gas in volume, thanks to its inventories and infrastructure. Deprived of Middle Eastern crude, Asian customers (India, China, Japan…) are rushing to buy heavily discounted Russian oil. Proof: before the Iran conflict, a barrel of Urals traded at a discount of around $10 to $13 versus Brent; it now trades at a premium of roughly $5 to $10 above the benchmark. In one week, Urals surged by nearly 100%, rising from $56 to more than $100 a barrel.
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Another factor: the US Treasury granted Indian refiners a 30-day waiver to import Russian oil that had previously been blocked. It is heavy with meaning: it formalizes the easing of a major part of oil sanctions against Moscow to relieve international markets. As a reminder, last August, Donald Trump imposed an additional 25% tariff on India's imports of Russian oil, arguing that continued purchases undermined the sanctions regime intended to force Vladimir Putin to negotiate over the war in Ukraine.
At the same time, the US Congress indefinitely extended a special license concerning oil giant Rosneft, one of the world's largest oil companies, and above all the main state-controlled oil company in Russia. Rosneft's German subsidiary, placed under trusteeship by Berlin since 2022, now benefits from a permanent exemption from US sanctions. This political move, following the German chancellor's visit to Washington, is aimed at securing output from German refineries (including Schwedt, which supplies Berlin) despite the global energy crisis. In other words, the planned "punishment” of Russia's energy sector has been quietly pushed back to spare allies and ensure smooth supplies.
This US diplomatic about-face (simultaneous with the strikes in the Middle East) means the Russian bear is gradually regaining market share: Moscow's oil now sells at a far smaller discount-or even at a premium-in Asian markets. Better still, Vladimir Putin can threaten Europe with an early halt to gas deliveries-effectively holding the Old Continent's energy security hostage-since Brussels does not plan to ban these imports entirely until 2027. At the forefront of this shift, Slovakia has just adjusted its gas contract with Gazprom, a Russian gas giant, to maintain supplies through to the end and reshuffle its options toward other Asian partners.
These dynamics are instantly giving the Russian economy some breathing room.
Geopolitical repercussions: from Ukraine to China
Beyond economics, the fallout from the conflict indirectly benefits Russia geopolitically. Western military support for Kyiv is being weakened, as U.S. and European attention is now monopolized by the Iran crisis. The United States, short of Patriot missiles, has reassigned its missile-defense arsenal to its bases in the Gulf, leaving Ukraine facing an even sharper air-defense shortage. As European Commissioner for Defence Andrius Kubilius noted, "the Americans will not be able to supply enough of these missiles for the Gulf countries, their own forces, and Ukraine”.
On China's side, the effects are more mixed. Beijing is also suffering from global disruptions (a drop in Qatari gas production, higher prices), but it is also benefiting from the chaos. The crisis validates China's argument that the world order is unstable and strengthens its determination to secure supplies. More broadly, Donald Trump's interventions in Iran and Venezuela feed a simple reading of the global balance of power in Beijing: major powers continue to reshape their immediate neighborhoods in the name of their strategic interests. In this context, China can more easily present its ambition over Taiwan as a logical extension of its own power doctrine, even as it officially repeats that the island falls under its sovereignty and its "national reunification”. For Xi Jinping, the stakes go far beyond political symbolism. Taiwan is home to a central link in the global semiconductor industry, with TSMC at the heart of an industrial ecosystem that has become vital to Western technology supply chains. Taking control of that asset would give Beijing far more than a territorial victory: an industrial, strategic and technological lever of considerable reach against the United States and Europe.
For now, Moscow can fill its coffers and threaten its enemies by wielding its energy levers. It remains to be seen whether this upswing can last. Crude prices could fall back if the conflict subsides or if countries adapt (Arab output returns, strategic reserves are tapped). And longer-term support for the Russian budget will also depend on a recovery in global demand. For Europe and the United States, the challenge is stark: competition in the energy market will be fiercer, and they must contend with an adversary that capitalizes on any form of disorder. The transatlantic pact has had to adapt under pressure-loosening sanctions to accommodate Berlin or support Delhi-and this crisis confirms that weakening Russia "at any price” is no longer conceivable without taking global market stability into account.
